suggest that certain Hispanic subpopulations -especially those born in the U.S. and immigrants who have secured citizenship -have higher unionization odds and join unions at higher rates than U.S.-born whites even after controlling for traditional positional accounts of labor organization. However, the large substantive effects of positional variables, such as sector, occupation, and firm size, indicate that organized labor's revival depends on more than any particular group's capacity for collective action.
INTRODUCTION
The highly publicized (and ultimately successful) organizing campaign of largely Hispanic janitors in Southern California during the late 1980s provided a beleaguered labor movement with a rare source of hope after decades of steady membership losses.
Nearing the 20 th anniversary of the Justice for Janitors campaign, it is time to evaluate our knowledge of the changing relationships between the labor movement and Hispanics in the contemporary U.S. Despite a rebirth of academic interest in organized labor since that successful organizing drive, we still know surprisingly little about basic patterns of unionization among Hispanics after the dramatic expansion of the Hispanic population following the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. Much of sociologists' focus in recent years has been on case studies of successful and unsuccessful organizing drives.
This research has generated important new theories about the interrelationships between labor organizing, immigrant incorporation, and Hispanics at the dawn of the 21 st Century, and deepened our knowledge of organizing trends in particular locales (California especially). However, the lack of a broad, national-level focus has left gaps in our understanding of how representative such campaigns really are, whether the labor movement has made quantifiable inroads into organizing Hispanic natives and immigrants during the last decades, or whether the factors leading to or impeding unionization among Hispanics and Hispanic subpopulations differ from those of other groups.
-2 -These unanswered questions remain important for two main reasons. On the one hand, the extraordinary growth and diversity of the nation's largest minority population has sparked a large body of literature investigating Hispanics' changing labor market outcomes (for recent treatments, see Borjas 2006; Massey 2007: Figure 4.6; Reed and Danziger 2007) . In decades past, minority populations -including immigrants and their offspring -have used union employment as a means of ascent to middle-class status (Lichtenstein 2002: 82-85; Milkman 2006: 119-122; Piore 1979: 156-157 Figure 1 below casts the issues of an expanding Hispanic population and a devastated labor movement in sharp relief. Over the last three and a half decades, as the Hispanic proportion of the working population nearly quadrupled, unionization rates halved. Research on the timing of union decline and Hispanic growth in specific industries goes far toward dispelling any causal link between the two trends in the past (Allen 1994; Milkman 2006: 105-107; Waldinger et al 1998) . However, hopes for the -3 -labor movement's revival may rest on whether organizers can capitalize on the burgeoning Hispanic population to swell union ranks in the future.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Our specific objectives are three-fold: First, using a dataset comprised of several series of Current Population Survey (CPS) data and spanning nearly four decades of growth and diversification in the Hispanic population, we provide the most comprehensive analysis of Hispanics and organized labor in the United States to date.
Unlike the few other quantitative analyses on this topic, the thirty-five years of data assembled for the project allow us to determine whether and how the relationship between Hispanics and labor unions has changed since the dramatic increase of the Hispanic population. Given the enormous diversity within the Hispanic population (for an early overview, see Portes and Truelove 1987) , we disaggregate models of union membership by subgroup, testing whether the factors affecting unionization differ according to whether one is an immigrant, time since immigration, citizenship, and national origin. -5 -
Solidaristic theories of union membership
The onset of severe deunionization in the 1970s coupled with a dramatic increase in the Hispanic population rekindled long-standing tensions between organized labor and the nation's fastest growing minority group. In Los Angeles, unionists were "openly hostile" to Hispanic workers pouring into the local labor market during the 1970s and 1980s (Milkman 2006: 114 This fear is echoed in recent comparative research on unionization rates and ethnic pluralism (Hechter 2004; Lee 2005 ). An influx of immigrants into a particular country is theorized to raise the costs of unionization by undermining local solidarity among the working class and ratcheting up competition between workers (Hechter 2004; Lee 2005) . Evidence for the effect remains uneven, however. Whereas Lee finds that a percentage point increase in the net migration rate is associated with approximately a half percentage point decrease in unionization (80: Table 2 , Model 5), Brady finds a positive effect of a country's net migration rate on its level of union membership (85 : Table 4, -6 -Model 5). While these studies do not focus specifically on the effect of growing ethnic pluralism on minorities' unionization rates, one implication of this theory is that organizers worried about the destabilizing impact of status competition may avoid bringing newcomers into labor's fold.
In the context of U.S. immigration patterns, a weaker version of the solidarity thesis presented above suggests that part of the process of economic assimilation for immigrant populations and their offspring involves developing the capacity for classbased collective action in the U.S. (Cohen 1990: 324-325; Piore 1979; Sanchez 1993 Fantasia and Voss 2004: 134-150; Lichtenstein 2002: 262-268; Milkman 2002; 2006: 114-116) . Many immigrants arrive from countries with a robust and vibrant labor movement, or with past experiences of other forms of collective mobilization (Lichtenstein 2002: 267) . These experiences in their homelands may make more recent arrivals receptive to union efforts, lowering their costs of organizing (Milkman 2006: 133) . Indeed, in a recent survey, Weir -10 -One such feature is high labor costs relative to other factors in production (Western 1994) . In industries with high wage bills combined with largely unskilled employment, the barriers to unionization are especially substantial: not only do employers' incentives against unionization rise with relative wage costs, the substitutability of labor lowers workers' bargaining leverage. Smaller firms raise the costs of unionization as well, as monitoring costs are low, thereby negating a potential benefit of union presence (Hirsch and Addison 1986: 61 ; for evidence of firm size effects on Hispanic immigrants' unionization rates, see Defreitas 1993) . Productivity gains spurred by union grievance procedures (and the resulting happier workforce) are likely lower in small firms, adding further to the costs of unionization (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Western 1994: 498) .
In modern capitalist economies, these characteristics -high wage bills, unskilled employment, and smaller firms -are found in many service industries, and contribute to the comparatively low unionization rates found in the service sector. By contrast, the capital-intensive manufacturing sector, with large, hierarchically arranged firms, constituted the unionized core of the economy in mid-20 th Century America and many other developed nations. That unionization rates have not declined in the U.S. and elsewhere even further with the collapse of manufacturing is due to robust public sector unionization rates. Costs of unionization in the public sector are lower for both employers, due to a looser connection between employment and wage levels (Western 1994) , and for union organizers, who can bypass the increasingly onerous demands of a union election drive and exert pressure on political actors to unionize government workers.
-11 -Industry location affects unionization costs independent of characteristics specific to the industry itself. High density locales reduces costs for organizers, leading to greater unionization rates in metropolitan areas. In the U.S., state-level differences in labor laws and the (related) less union-friendly political environment of the South may depress unionization rates, other factors held constant. Occupation factors into unionization patterns as well. Costs of organizing white collar workers -with well-defined career ladders, higher levels of workplace autonomy, and greater pay -are higher than their blue-collar counterparts, who are less likely to identify with management in battles over representation (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Western 1994 For the final set of analyses presented in Table 5 we take advantage of the limited longitudinal feature of the CPS to construct 1-year mini-panels using the CPS-MORG data. Because all CPS respondents are interviewed for a period, are then re-interviewed after a hiatus, a portion of any given year's sample is re-interviewed the following year.
We capitalize on the survey's structure, and match a respondent's data across these two observation points to identify changes in key characteristics over a one-year period.
These mini-panels allow us to isolate the population of respondents who gain union status across a particular year. For our final models, we restrict the sample to the last five years of available data, providing insight into the most recent trends in unionization. For a more thorough discussion of the matching procedure used in our analysis, see Appendix A.
3 Table 1 below presents sample sizes for the various data sets used in the analysis along with unweighted descriptives of key covariates (a full set of descriptives for all controls used in the models are available from the authors on request). Interestingly, in the early years of our samples Hispanic unionization rates actually exceed those of others by three percentage points. The surveys covering later years -CPS-MORG and CPSMarch -suggests a temporal shift as Hispanic unionization rates average slightly below those of non-Hispanics. Table 1 includes transportation industry means as well as averages for two occupational categories due to the strong effects these controls have in subsequent models; a listing of the sixteen additional industry dummies and two other occupational dummies included in the models is available in Appendix B.
[ For the main set of analyses, our outcome variable of interest is a binary measure of union status. Given that our dependent variable is dichotomous, we fit a series of logistic regression models for these analyses. For individual i,
where H captures whether the respondent is Hispanic, X i is a set of demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic covariates, and i ε is residual individual-level variation.
We present odds ratios from the logistic regressions due to their ease of interpretability, supplementing key results with estimates of the predicted change in unionization probability given a particular outcome of a covariate of interest.
The main models contain a four-category race/ethnicity measure (white, AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, and other (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000) , however, other work has shown higher levels of support for unions among younger non-members (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 31) . Traditionally, unionists have been largely "'3M' (male, manual, manufacturing)"
workers, although the rapid growth of public sector unionization has tempered the gender gap in representation (Visser 2002: 405) . The growth of public sector unions relative to once-strong manufacturing unions may have also altered the relationship between education and unionization: Whereas past theory suggests that unions benefit lesseducated workers with fewer outside employment prospects (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 98), more recent empirical work has found a positive union-education relationship (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000: Appendix A). To the extent that these demographic factors affect unionization costs, groups that vary by age, gender, and education will have different membership rates.
The geographical controls we introduce include four dummy measures of metropolitan residence, four region dummies, and -in the most restrictive models -state fixed effects. Our full model includes all of the demographic and geographic controls described above, plus a dichotomous sector measure, occupation and industry fixed effects. In the full models we substitute a potential experience (age minus years spent in school) and potential experience squared measure for the age and age squared variables.
Year dummies are included in the cross-year models presented in Tables 2 and 3. For   -15 -supplementary models presented in Tables 2 and 3 , we include measures of firm size.
We present the controls used for the various models in more detail in Appendix B.
Since many unions push to convert part-time positions to full-time during contract negotiations, in the models presented here we do not include a measure of full-time status. However, given the strong positive relationships between ethnicity, immigrant status, and contingent work arrangements (including part-time status) (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000) , and the strong negative relationship between unionization and contingent work arrangements, as a robustness check we include a full-time indicator for our main models; results are substantively similar from the ones presented in the article and available upon request. We also test to see whether our model results differ when controlling for whether the respondent moved in the prior year (a variable only available in a subset of the 1983-2007 CPS-March series). Results remain unaffected; truncated models with the move covariate are available upon request. We do not include an income measure due to endogeneity, as unionization has long been associated with higher wages. 5 We modeled the population of joiners for the entire 1983-2007 period, but only present here the results from more recent years. Full model results are available from the authors on request.
-16 -where α j is a constant, H captures whether the respondent is Hispanic, X i is a set of demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic covariates, β j and γ j are vectors of regression coefficients, for j=1,2,…, J-1 and ij ε is residual individual-level variation. π ij reflects the probability of being in outcome category j for each individual i. This model is analogous to a series of J-1 binary logistic regression equations that contrast each outcome j against a common category J.
The controls for these models largely mirror those previously discussed for the main analysis, with the following exceptions. In these models we use region dummies rather than state fixed effects, owing to computation challenges in estimating the more complex multinomial logit model with year, state, industry, and occupation fixed effects.
6
The mini-panel models also include controls for experiencing a change in industry or occupation between the two time periods, and a specification limited to only those individuals with stable industry and occupation codes across the two periods.
RESULTS

Modeling unionization among Hispanics
In Table 2 below, we begin the multivariate analyses by testing what variables help explain unionization differences between Hispanics and others for a subset of our time period, 1983-2007, using CPS-March files. 8 The first column presents odds ratios 6 Checks of reduced models using state fixed effects result in substantively similar findings. 7 A lack of information on specific job moves in the CPS-MORG series prevents us from restricting the sample to only those individuals with the same employer across panels. 8 We exclude the May years of the survey (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) for these models for the following reasons: Lack of state identifiers for most states prior to 1977 prevent the inclusion of state fixed-effects, and inconsistencies in the industry and occupation codes between the CPS-May and CPS-March surveys prevent a seamless comparison between survey years. CPS-May data is utilized for the individual year models presented in Figure 2 .
-17 - [ The final column in Table 2 includes all the variables of the labor market position model plus a set of firm size dummy variables (firm size measures are available only in a portion of the CPS-March surveys). Odds ratios of unionization for employees in the largest firm size category -1,000 workers or more -are over four times those for employees working in the smallest category of less than 25 employees, consistent with structural explanations for inter-firm union variation (Hirsch and Addison 1986; Western 1994 ). The firm size controls do not affect the Hispanic odds ratios. Hispanics as a whole seem no more or less "organizable" than whites; differences in raw unionization rates observed in Table 1 can be attributed to differences in positional characteristics that pattern unionization rates in the contemporary U.S.
The cross-year models presented in Table 2 obscure any time variation in the relationship between Hispanics and unionization. In Figure 2 below we present oddsratios for individual-year models using CPS-May and CPS-MORG data. The point estimates represent Hispanic odds ratios of unionization and are derived from models run -18 -on each year of survey data. The reference category is white workers' odds of unionization. The dark line represents models that only include race/ethnicity identifiers.
As shown, the series trends sharply downward over the three and a half decades covered by our data. Whereas in the mid-1970s Hispanics had around 20% higher odds of unionization than whites, by the late 1990s Hispanics' odds of unionization stabilized at about 20% lower than those of whites.
To investigate whether the temporal shift reflects positional differences between the populations or results from other factors, we next run labor market position models on each survey year. Models used to generate the series include the same set of covariates shown in Table 2 with the exception of firm size dummies (unavailable in both the CPS-
May and CPS-MORG surveys).
9 Two results from the picture stand out: One, for the majority of the series the point estimates hover right near one, indicating little difference in unionization odds between Hispanics and whites once one adjusts for differences in labor market position. Indeed, the Hispanic odds ratio is significant for less than a third of the years in our data (p-values and confidence intervals for the 68 models used to generate Figure 3 available upon request) . Two, the trendline shows a slightly downward slope. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Hispanics' odds of unionization fall below one; for five out of the last six years of data, the difference in odds ratios between whites and
Hispanics is significant at the .05 level. To investigate this temporal pattern in more detail, we now turn to analyses that disaggregate the Hispanic population by time since immigration, citizenship, and nationality.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
-19 -
Modeling unionization among Hispanic subpopulations: 1994-2007
In the tables that follow, we present only the odds ratios for various Hispanic subcategories. Except for the models restricted to immigrants only, the reference category is non-immigrant whites. All models include the full set of covariates from The non-significant effect for the earliest arrivals remains somewhat puzzling. Sample sizes for certain immigrant subcategories run quite low, and this result may reflect a lack of power in the model.
-21 -large firms. The durable fault lines seem to reside along citizenship and time since arrival, not nationality.
The final set of models in Table 3 restricts the sample to immigrants only. Here we test whether Hispanics' odds of unionization differ from other immigrants' odds along the two key dimensions of citizenship and nationality. These models control for years since immigration. For the citizenship analyses, the reference group is white immigrant citizens. For the nationality investigation, the reference group is white immigrants.
Controlling for duration in the U.S., no evidence exists to suggest that organizers resist unionizing Hispanics compared to other immigrant populations; indeed, among Hispanic citizens, these models reveal a higher likelihood of being organized. Interestingly, noncitizen Hispanics have similar unionization odds as white immigrant citizens, suggestive that group solidarity can partially overcome barriers to unionization associated with noncitizen status. The nationality investigations reveal no significant differences between Mexican immigrants, non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants (mostly Central Americans), and whites.
The results from Table 3 reveal important subpopulation differences among Hispanics. The question remains how these findings compare in magnitude to the effects of key labor market position determinants of unionization. For the citizenship model in which we control for firm size, the 34% lower odds of unionization among Hispanic noncitizens translates into a predicted probability of belonging to a union 3.6 percentage points lower than the unionization probability of a Hispanic non-immigrant, setting the other covariates at their mean values. Other predictions (not shown; available upon request) reveal a roughly similar negative difference in the probability of unionization -22 -between the most recent Hispanic migrants and Hispanic non-immigrants. To put these differences in context, in Table 4 below we present differences in predicted probabilities for some of the major structural covariates in our model. The influence of citizenship status and time since migration on unionization probabilities is dwarfed by the positional characteristics of firm size, sector, and occupation.
[ 
Modeling transitions in union status
Union membership rates combine individuals who have belonged to a union for decades with those who joined a week prior to the survey. To target the latest developments in unionization, we use the 1-year mini-panels created from the CPS-MORG series to isolate the population of union joiners (see the details of constructing this dataset in the earlier data section or Appendix A). In Table 5 below, we again disaggregate the Hispanic population by duration of U.S. residence, citizenship status, and nationality, and model the odds of joining a union relative to never being in a union.
We present results from four specifications: one capturing labor market positional factors, a second including a dummy variable to account for any change in industry or occupation across the two observations, a third restricting the analysis to those individuals who remained in the same occupation and industry across the two time periods, 11 and finally a replication of the labor market position specification limited only to the last five years (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) .
11 Substantive results are similar if we instead limit to only individuals who do change industry or occupation.
-23 -
The first three sets of models corroborate the findings from Table 3 Non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants, along with Mexican-origin and other Hispanic-origin natives have odds 22-60% higher than native born whites, translating to a 0.7 to 1.7 point difference in the probability of joining a union.
Results of the first three sets of models suggest duration of residence in the U.S. is the primary hindrance to joining a union among Hispanics and Hispanic immigrants.
While non-citizens and Mexican immigrants do not display higher odds of joining a union than native whites, this may simply result from the short duration of stay in the U.S. among these groups. We also examine the influence of citizenship and nationality, controlling for duration of U.S. residence in models limited to immigrants. These results (reported in the final section of Table 5 ) confirm that net of the influence of duration of residence in the U.S., Hispanic non-citizens and Mexican immigrants are no less likely, and in some cases are more likely, to join a union than other immigrants.
[ This pattern also has historical precedent, as union queues are often long, and immigrants' first U.S. jobs often rely on informal networks that steer the arrivals toward relatively unorganized niches (Alba and Nee 2003: 232-235 ; for the role of subcontractors in the hiring of recent Hispanic arrivals, see Massey 2007: 143-146) .
Economic ascent among immigrant populations and their offspring typically occurs after
transitioning into the open labor market, where union jobs are more likely to be found.
-25 -These results remain relatively unsurprising, given past research on minority populations and economic incorporation.
What is surprising is the evidence we uncover revealing higher unionization probabilities among certain Hispanic subpopulations. Even in our most restrictive models (last column of Table 3 ), Hispanic immigrant citizens have much higher odds of unionized employment than native whites, controlling for a battery of relevant labor market position variables. The analyses using mini-panels (Table 5) Among immigrant populations, Hispanics tend to have higher probabilities of being in a union (Table 4) , and of joining a union (Table 5) . Taken together, these results suggest that solidaristic ties help Hispanics overcome other barriers to unionization, and point to a promising site for labor organizers desperate for new members. To the extent that union membership continues to provide a toe-hold to the middle-class among economically disadvantaged groups, these findings portend economic gains over time and across generations for Hispanic immigrants and their offspring.
The results from the nationality models and models restricted to immigrant populations offer insights into various proposed mechanisms stemming from solidaristic theories of collective action. We find very little evidence to buttress claims suggesting organizers avoid Mexicans, given high rates of return migration among this Hispanic subpopulation. While Mexican immigrants seem to join unions at lower rates than Mexican non-immigrants and non-Mexican Hispanic migrants, their odds of joining rival those of native whites (Table 5) . Membership rates among Mexican immigrants trail -26 -those of native whites, but the difference disappears after restricting the analysis to workers in large firms (Table 4) . Evidence of greater capacity for collective mobilization among non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants is likewise mixed: While membership rates for non-Mexican Hispanics is comparatively high in some of our models, the results are not robust to restricting the sample to large firms. However, the final models in Table 5 do reveal higher odds of joining unions for non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants compared to other immigrant populations, perhaps indicative of past experiences with collective action and labor organization among these (largely Central American) migrants.
While we believe these insights help illuminate our understanding of the dynamics between Hispanic subpopulations, solidarity theories, and labor organization over the past decades, certain shortcomings remain. Similar to past research on the topic, our models lack exact tests that can differentiate between various hypotheses stemming from solidaristic theories of group mobilization. We cannot determine precisely, for example, whether the elevated odds of unionization for Hispanic subpopulations uncovered in our analyses stem from past experiences of labor organization or from organizers' ability to capitalize on ethnic-based solidarities. Definitive statements regarding the precise characteristics specific to Hispanic subpopulations leading to high unionization rates await further in-depth qualitative work.
Regardless of the precise mechanisms, the elevated odds of joining a union for Hispanics to decrease, threatening their economic gains. Second, the institutional framework that has constrained organizing efforts in the U.S. for over half a century now must change if labor hopes for a turnaround. The substantive effects of the positional variables uncovered in our models highlight the difficulty of organizing high-growth service industries in the private sector. Altering this equation likely requires dramatically changing the legal-political environment surrounding unions and employers in the U.S.
Without such a development, unionization rates will remain at historic lows, regardless of any particular group's capacity for collective action. Table 4 , column 2. Predictions generated using the STATA version 10 prchange command. A full set of predicted probabilities for all covariates in the model is available from the authors on request. Data come from the matched MORG files, 1996 -2007. All models include region, metro, and year effects and all covariates shown in the Full Model from Table 3 . Reference category in all models is non-immigrant whites. All models weighted with the appropriate final CPS weights. Odds ratios from suppressed covariates available upon request. Reference category is non-immigrant whites in sections 1-3, and immigrant whites in the last set of models.
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